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In explaining the timeline of events surrounding Donald Trump’s accusation on March 4, 2017, 
that former President Obama tapped his phones during the 2016 presidential campaign, Jana 
Heigl, reporting for Politifact, wrote: 
Obama … immediately react[ed] to the accusations in a statement, asserting through his 
spokesperson Kevin Lewis that "neither Barack Obama nor any White House official 
under Obama ever ordered surveillance of any U.S. citizen." (Heigl 2017) 
This is an example of proxy assertion. In proxy assertion one person or group (the principal), 
asserts something through another (the proxy) who speaks on the principal’s behalf. The 
paradigmatic example of proxy assertion is making an assertion through a spokesperson. When 
an individual or a group’s spokesperson speaks in her capacity as spokesperson, then the 
individual or group is credited, it seems, with a speech act, with having asserted, or explained, 
or questioned or ordered something, and so on. What makes this possible? How is it related to 
an individual asserting something himself, in his own voice? What is the nature of the speech 
act that the proxy performs, as opposed to the principal, through the proxy? 
Proxy assertion and proxy speech acts more generally are instances of the proxy agency 
(Copp 1979, 1980; Ludwig 2014).1 In proxy agency what one agent or group of agents does, in 
appropriate circumstances, makes it the case that another agent or group, or in many cases a 
group subsuming that agent or group, has done something. For example, if I give someone a 
power of attorney to close on the sale of my home while I am out of the country, when she 
signs the papers at closing, I count as closing the sale of the home. When a corporation’s 
lawyers file bankruptcy papers, the corporation counts as filing for bankruptcy (as opposed to 
the lawyers). When a manager in a company extends an offer of employment to an applicant, 
the company offers the applicant employment.  
Proxy agency is an essentially social phenomenon. This is not only because it involves 
minimally two people, one of whom is a proxy for the other, but also because it works by way 
                                                        
1 Methodological note: ‘Proxy agency’ and ‘proxy assertion’ are terms of art, introduced to help us 
identify and keep track of a genus and species of a certain type of institution.  This chapter explores the 
conceptual landscape of speaking in someone or some group’s name, that is, of proxy assertion, and its 
relations to speaking in one’s own voice.  The method is to look at core cases and then at how the 
institution can be extended to groups and to allow the spokesperson some autonomy in representing 
her principal.  We begin with examples and draw on prior theorizing about the social, particularly work 
on status functions and we-intentions, and give an explanatory account, one which accords with 
common sense observations and our understanding the conceptual contours of paradigmatic examples.   
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of the proxy being authorized to represent, in certain respects, his principal, in social 
interactions with others, who must themselves be in on the arrangements by which this is 
accomplished, if it is to be successful. In the following, I develop an account of proxy assertion 
in the context of a general account of proxy agency. The key to understanding proxy agency is 
understanding the concepts of a status function and a status role. A status function is a function 
that something has in a social transaction that it can perform only in virtue of its being, in a 
sense to be explained, collectively accepted that it has that function (Searle 1995: 41, 2010: 7). 
A status role is a status function attaching to an agent in which the agent’s expression of her 
agency in the role is crucial to fulfilling the function (Ludwig 2017a: sec. 10.1). The role of 
spokesperson is a status role. The utterance acts the spokesperson performs in her role have 
status functions. We understand the function of proxy assertion and how it is achieved when 
we understand the roles of the spokesperson and the status functions she imposes on 
utterance acts in that capacity. 
In section 2, I provide a deflationary account of constitutive rules and explain how they 
underwrite a form of constitutive agency. In section 3, I show how constitutive rules governing 
social transactions that define roles for objects in them without specifying what is to play those 
roles give rise to coordination problems. I explain status functions as the result of the agents 
who jointly intend to engage in the relevant social transactions intentionally coordinating on 
the same things as filling the roles. I then explain status roles as status functions of agents in 
which the expression of their agency in the role is essential for the function to be expressed. In 
section 4, I apply this framework to give an account of how, and in what sense, a 
spokesperson’s saying something can count as her principal making an assertion, when she 
represents an individual. In section 5, I apply the framework to a spokesperson for a group. In 
section 6, I discuss the complications introduced by spokesperson autonomy, in which the 
spokesperson is given general directions for representing the principal. Section 7 is a brief 
summary. 
 
2. Constitutive Rules 
 
Constitutive rules are rules the intentional following of which constitute the activity that they 
govern and without which there would be no activities of that type. The rules of chess or 
football are constitutive rules in this sense. The concept of a constitutive rule can be found in 
Kant and Wittgenstein and has been developed or invoked in one form or another by (Rawls 
1955; Anscombe 1958; Hart 1961; Searle 1964, 1969, 1995, 2005), among others. Constitutive 
rules are contrasted with regulative rules, which govern a type of activity whose existence does 
not depend on the rules or on their being followed. Traffic laws and Roberts Rules of Order are 
examples of regulative rules. There would be traffic even if there are no laws governing it, and 
there would be meetings even if no one had ever thought of Robert’s Rules of Order. In 
contrast there wouldn’t be any such thing as chess or football if the rules for them hadn’t been 
invented. What makes a rule constitutive of a type of activity? The answer is that they are 
constitutive relative to an action type that requires as a matter of the concept that subsumes it 
that it come about by virtue of one or more people intentionally instantiating it in accordance 
with the rules (Ludwig 2017a: ch. 7).  
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Some action types, such as breaking a vase or embarrassing a friend, are neutral with 
respect to whether they are intentional. Some are essentially intentional, such as waiting for a 
friend or looking for your keys, or firing an employee. Some essentially intentional action types 
require a specific pattern of activity, such as yoga or solitaire, and some are both essentially 
intentional and essentially collective, such as an orchestral performance of a symphony, or 
dancing the tango, or playing chess or football. The relevant pattern of activity can be 
instantiated without its being intentional. Thus, chess involves a pattern of activity defined by 
the possible legal games of chess. A pattern of activity conforming to the rules could be 
instantiated though the participants didn’t intend to be playing chess or anything else and had 
never heard of the game. The pattern of activity can be expressed with a set of propositions 
describing the actions the participants. These descriptions become rules when they are used 
jointly by the participants with the intention that they instantiate the activity pattern. Relative 
to an activity type that requires that the pattern to be instantiated by the participants jointly 
intentionally, the rules are constitutive rules. Thus, constitutive rules are constitutive relative to 
an activity type that is defined in terms of an activity pattern described by the rules being 
intentionally instantiated by those realizing it, either a single agent, if an individual pattern (as 
in the case of solitaire), or a group of individuals, if it is a collective activity.  It follows that for 
any set of regulative rules governing a (potentially cooperative) activity type that can exist 
independently of the rules being followed, there is an activity type relative to which they are 
constitutive rules. Thus, if we define legal driving as driving in accordance with traffic laws, 
traffic laws become constitutive rules of legal driving. If we define a parliamentary meeting as 
one conducting in accordance with Robert’s Rules of Order, then Robert’s Rules of Order are 
constitutive rules for the conduct of parliamentary meetings.  
Constitutive rules underwrite a form of constitutive agency that is pervasive in the social 
realm. When you follow a constitutive rule intentionally, you contribute not only causally to the 
production of an action type but also constitutively, since following the rules in producing it is 
part of what is required for the concept to subsume the activity. When a judge says, in 
appropriate circumstances, “I hereby sentence you to life in prison without parole,” she brings 
it about that a defendant is sentenced to life in prison without parole. What she says 
constitutes sentencing the defendant, and she sentences the defendant by saying what she 
does as a judge in the circumstances. She does it by following rules constitutive of proper 
sentencing in a trial. 
 
3. Status Functions and Status Roles 
 
Status functions are agentive functions (Searle 1995: ch. 2). An agentive function is defined in 
relation to the goals or purposes of agents. Examples are being a hammer, a battleship, a 
paperweight, a chair, a gun, a crosscut saw, a rowing scull, a $20 dollar bill, a constitution, a 
judge. Being a $20 dollar bill, a constitution, and a judge, are also status functions. Status 
functions are distinguished among agentive functions in that they can perform their functions 
only if it is collectively accepted that they have them in the relevant communities. In contrast, a 
gun’s being able to perform its function, to fire a bullet, depends only on its physical 
construction.  
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Why are $20 bills different from guns in not being able to fulfill their function unless 
they are collectively accepted as having it? To explain this, we begin with a simpler example. To 
be a rook in chess is to have a status function. Nothing can perform the function of a rook 
unless it is collectively accepted by the players that it has that function. What explains this? The 
rules of chess define how a rook is to be moved in playing chess. They use the word ‘rook’, but 
they do not say what objects or types of objects in the world count. The rules therefore define a 
functional role for certain things in a social transaction, without specifying what is to play the 
role. This presents any pair of people wanting to play chess with a coordination problem. To 
play chess they have to jointly intentionally coordinate on the same things for the roles of 
pawn, rook, knight, and so on. In doing so, they impose on certain objects the status roles of 
pawn, rook, knight, and so on. Of course, there are pieces designed for those roles, but we can 
press anything into service as pieces as long as they can be distinguished so that we can track 
what we assigned the roles to.  
What does collective acceptance come to on this view? Effective coordination on the 
same things just comes to the players’ intentions to play being directed at the same things for 
the various roles for pieces, in the joint activity they intend to engage in. Their intentions in this 
case are directed toward their doing something together (intentionally), and so are we-
intentions. A we-intention, in the terminology of Tuomela and Miller (1988), is the sort of 
intention one has when doing something with others jointly intentionally, e.g., in moving a 
bench together intentionally, in playing chess, or in shaking hands.  This need not involve any 
explicit agreement, though the coordinated states they are in are of the sort that would result 
from a sincere explicit agreement on how to solve the problem. Similarly, a $20 bill plays the 
role of a unit of monetary exchange in an economic system with money in circulation. What 
makes something a $20 bill is that there is a community with generalized conditional we-
intentions to treat things of a certain physical type produced at an official mint in the role of 
$20 bills whenever they engage in relevant economic transactions. Thus, the reason that 
collective acceptance is required for something with a status function to perform its function is 
that the function is a role in a social transaction that those engaging in it must tacitly agree 
attaches to certain things rather than others that might serve equally well, since success 
depends on coordinating on the same things in the relevant roles (Ludwig 2017a: ch. 9).  
Status roles are a subclass of status functions (Ludwig 2017a: sec. 10.1). A status role is a 
status function assigned to an agent whose function requires the agent to express her agency 
intentionally in the role. We can distinguish agent and patient status roles. An agent status role 
is one in which the person with the role is part of the group that collectively accepts that she 
has it. Examples are being a judge, or a university professor, or a senator. A patient status role 
attaches to someone even if she is not part of the group that collective accepts that she has it. 
Examples are being a POW or a defendant at a trial. Importantly, someone in a status role may 
be authorized to perform actions in her role that, by virtue of that fact, have a status function 
that plays a role in other social transactions. A notary public in witnessing an agreement and 
affixing her stamp determines, other conditions being in place, that it is officially recognized for 
subsequent transactions. Citizens vote, and in so doing, assign the status role of president to an 
individual, who then in virtue of that is able to play a particular role in a range of further social 
transactions, including assigning other status functions and roles. In giving a power of attorney 
to someone to close on the sale of my house, I determine that her signature on the closing 
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papers has the status of completing the contract. For further discussion, see (Ludwig 2017a: 
chs. 8-10). 
 
4. The Spokesperson for an individual 
 
The spokesperson occupies a status role. Her utterances, in her role as spokesperson, have 
status functions. The function of the spokesperson is to enable another person, or a group, 
which may subsume the spokesperson, to represent themselves roughly as if they were 
embodied in the spokesperson making an assertion (or performing another speech act) in their 
own right. The case is somewhat different for individuals representing themselves through a 
proxy and for groups. I will take up the case of the individual represented by a spokesperson 
first, and then turn to the group that represents itself by way of a spokesperson in the next 
section. 
The spokesperson may simply repeat a message she has been given, as in the case that 
begins this chapter, in which Kevin Lewis repeated a prepared statement, on behalf of former 
president Obama. The spokesperson may also have a writ that provides for answering 
questions about an individual or a group’s views, or explaining her principal’s position, in her 
own words. In this section, I focus on the simpler case, and return to proxy agent autonomy in 
section 6.  
The spokesperson enables someone to represent himself to his audience when he is not 
present. For the spokesperson to perform that role (a) she must be designated as a 
spokesperson by the principal, that is, be authorized to speak on his behalf and (b) those with 
whom the principal intends to communicate must (i) be in on the general arrangement by 
which the principal intends to signal his commitments and (ii) know of the person chosen that 
she has been authorized to speak in the principal’s name. Being in on the general arrangement 
means, first, understanding the kind of social transaction the audience and principal are to 
engage in, second, having collectively accepted, with those who operate with spokespersons, 
these arrangements as the method by which that kind of social transaction is to be carried out, 
and, third, having collectively accepted, again with those who operate with spokespersons, as a 
part of the arrangements, a procedure by which the role of spokesperson is assigned.  
Proxy assertion aims to enable someone to do something that is at a certain level of 
abstraction functionally equivalent to asserting something in person. What is that? Assertion is 
a type of illocutionary act. Its sincerity condition is belief and its direction of fit is word-to-world 
(Searle 1979). Paradigmatically, assertion is a move in a communicative exchange. One may 
assert something when no one is around, as when writing in a secret diary. Still, assertions 
outside of communicative exchanges are understood in relation to the paradigm cases. We 
understand them as assertions because they are relevantly similar to assertion in 
communicative contexts. Henceforth, I focus on paradigmatic assertion in a communicative 
exchange. Plausibly, even the minimal unit in a communicative exchange, in which one person 
asserts something and another listens, is a move in an essential intentional action type (Clark 
1996; Jankovic 2014b, 2014a; Miller 2016; Jankovic 2018). The speaker performs an utterance 
act on a certain condition, say, that p, and the auditor listens to what the speaker says with the 
goal of ascertaining what that condition is, and this is something that they do together 
intentionally, each understanding the others’ role. In this way, the speaker recruits an 
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utterance act (construed broadly to include signing and writing) as a nonnatural indicator of a 
state of affairs . On this account, in distinction from Grice’s intention-based analysis of 
utterance meaning (Grice 1957), the speaker does not treat her audience as an instrument of 
her will, but as someone with whom she is cooperating, at least for a particular purpose. This 
means that her intention is a we-intention rather than an I-intention.2   
The direction of fit and sincerity condition for assertion fall out of this account. The 
sincerity condition is belief because if one is doing one’s part one believes that the condition on 
which the utterance is to be made obtains.  That in turn is what the utterance represents as 
being the case.  The direction of fit is word-to-world because when conventional meaning 
bearers are employed, their proper use in assertion requires using words that represent the 
condition on which the speaker utters them.3  
 What is the function of assertion? The speaker’s role is to perform an overt act on a 
certain condition where the audience can attend.  The audience’s role is to attend to the 
speaker doing so part in their joint action.  The further goal of the joint action in the core case is 
to inform the auditor of the condition on which the speaker performs the speech act, e.g., the 
function of the Sexton putting one lantern the belfry of the North Church in Boston was to 
inform Paul Revere that the British are coming by land.  I call this the core case because it is, as 
it were, the “original” function of assertion, that in terms of which we understand extensions of 
the concept.  In core cases, then, the function of assertion is to inform, and it is successful only 
if it does.  This is achieved by the audience attending to the speaker performing her role in 
conditions in which he is confident of her sincerity and competence. This gives us a factive 
sense of communication, or communication as factive.  However, we often think 
communication as successful even when this does not happen.  So we also have a concept of 
non-factive communication. This requires for success only that the audience recognize the 
condition on which the speaker represents herself as performing the utterance. This is 
equivalent to the audience recognizing the speaker as asserting something and what the 
                                                        
2 The shift from I-intentions to we-intentions has an important advantage.  Grice’s original account held 
that a speaker S meant something by an utterance u iff for some audience A, S uttered u intending (i) A 
to produce a response R, (ii) A to recognizing S intends (i), and (iii) A to produce R on the basis of (ii).  
This fails to be sufficient, however, because if S deceives A about S’s intention in (ii), S doesn’t mean 
anything by u (see the discussion in Grice (1969)). One can add that S intends A is to recognize the 
intention in (ii), but if S intends A to be deceived about this further intention, again, S doesn’t mean 
anything by u.  In the literature, the intuitive requirement on communication that this illustrates has 
come to be called the overtness of communicative intention.  A benefit of reconceptualizing the 
speaker’s intention as a we-intention is that we-intentions are demonstrably incompatible with 
intending to deceive someone with whom one does something about the nature of one’s intentions 
directed at the joint task (Jankovic 2014).  Thus, the overtness of communicative intention is secured by 
conceptualizing it as directed at a contribution to a joint intentional action.     
3 In terms of MacFarlane’s (MacFarlane 2011) division of theories of assertion into those according to 
which it is (i) expressing an attitude, (ii) making a move defined by constitutive rules, (iii) proposing to 
add information to the conversational common ground, or (iv) undertaking a commitment, this account 
appeals in core cases to constitutive rules for a collective action type, but it is very different from the 
usual development of the idea, e.g., in (Williamson 1996).  It should be clear how the account sketched 
in the text can explain the features that other accounts have cited as central to understanding assertion. 
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speaker asserts. In virtue of asserting something, the speaker incurs certain commitments. The 
speaker commits herself to what she asserts, and gives leave to her audience to rely on it, in 
the same sense in which whenever one cooperates with others in doing something one gives 
leave to them to rely on one’s doing one’s part. Because doing her part involves her believing 
what she asserts, and she represents herself as doing her part, she represents herself as 
believing what she asserts. She therefore also gives leave to her audience to rely on her acting 
in accordance with what she asserts. In virtue of this, the audience, in particular, is in a position 
to call the speaker to account if she does not believe what she asserts and does not act in 
accord with it.  I will call this communication as representation.  In communication as 
representation, the function of assertion is to get the audience to recognize that the speaker 
represents herself as doing something on a certain condition—the one expressed by the 
sentence uttered when using conventional meaning bearers in their conventional roles. 
Proxy assertion is an extension of this basic practice.4 It looks backwards to, and 
presupposes an understanding of, what it is for a person to assert something in her own voice. 
Its point, at least in the most basic case, is to commit the principal with respect to an audience 
in all the same ways that he would be committed if he had asserted the same thing to the same 
audience. Thus, the principal and the audience agree that someone can stand in for him when 
that person is authorized to do so, performing an utterance action of the sort she would 
perform were she speaking in her own voice, but instead speaking in the assigned role. The 
utterance act she thereby performs has a status function. Its function is to commit the principal 
just as if he had asserted in his own voice the content of the utterance. It has that status 
function because the speaker has the status role of spokesperson, that is, has been authorized 
by the principal, and is acting in that role, and the community understands and accepts the 
background practice.  
Although we use the term ‘assertion’ in characterizing what the principal does (an 
individual in the present case) through a spokesperson, it is an extension of the basic notion. 
We signal this when we add ‘through his spokesperson’ to the report that someone asserted 
something. To indicate this, I will underline ‘assertion’ and its variants when speaking of proxy 
assertion with an individual as principal. I will also underline ‘assertion’ after ‘proxy’ when I 
have in mind the individual as principal (proxy assertion), but not when I mean to use the 
phrase in a more general sense, e.g., to cover both the case of the individual and the group as 
principal (proxy assertion)—the genus as opposed to the species falling within it.  
Why is proxy assertion not just plain assertion? Assertion is something one does, like 
smiling, without the intervention of another’s agency.  It is, in core cases, a first person move in 
an essentially intentional joint action with an audience, in which the speaker acts directly to 
produce an utterance act on a condition obtaining.  The mechanism of proxy assertion is more 
complex.  It involves inserting another agent into the causal chain between principal and 
audience.  It presupposes assertion as its model, for it aims to do something analogous, but at 
one remove.  The proxy performs an utterance act in her own right.  Its meaning is determined 
relative to her context, not the principal’s (more on this below).  The principal need not perform 
                                                        
4 While I have sketched an account of first person assertion to have something specific to look back to, 
much of what follows will be theory neutral, and at least many of the features noted about first person 
assertion will be accepted by most theorists. 
For The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, ed. Sandy Goldberg. 
 8 
any utterance act when asserting something through his proxy.  He may be asleep, 
unconscious, or dead, when his spokesperson speaks. So when he asserts something through a 
spokesperson he is not thereby asserting anything. But we use the same term for assertion and 
assertion because the social effect of assertion is intended, and designed, to be analogous to 
assertion, and in practice it is clear from context what is going on.  When it is not we indicate 
the sense by adding a prepositional phrase such as ‘through his spokesperson’. 
Still, if the principal asserts something through the proxy, doesn't that entail that the 
principal does something? But how does the principal assert something if he is not doing 
anything? When the principal authorizes someone as a spokesperson, and gives her instructions 
about how to represent him, he sets in motion a mechanism which results in the production of 
an utterance act by the spokesperson acting in her role in front of a relevant audience. So the 
principal asserts something by making arrangements for it, the appointment of a spokesperson, 
and the direction for conveying a particular message.  In this way, his agency is expressed 
through what the spokesperson does, just as a general’s agency is expressed in what the army 
he commands does.  
What kind of speech act is the proxy performing? How do we characterize what she 
does? Just as we can say that the principal asserts something through the spokesperson, we can 
say that the spokesperson asserts something on behalf of the principal. For example: 
 
On behalf of the President, the spokesman asserted that Mr. Nixon had not had “put 
before him the decision regarding Mr. Fitzgerald.” (Modern Constitutional Law: Cases, 
Problems and Practice, Lawrence Friedman. Nixon v. Fitzgerald 457 U.S. 731 (1982)) 
 
However, when a spokesperson asserts something on behalf of her principal, she is not thereby 
asserting something in her own voice (we come to some complications in a moment). Nixon’s 
spokesperson may very well have believed what he was asserting to be false. But it is Nixon 
who is responsible for propagating a falsehood knowingly if so, not the spokesperson. The 
spokesperson is not charged with lying or insincerity; rather, Nixon is. It is not an expectation of 
the spokesperson that she believe or know or have evidence for what she asserts on behalf of 
her principal. So here too in the phrase ‘assert on behalf of’ we have a use of ‘assert’ distinct 
from its use in characterizing an assertion in one’s own voice. But since it focuses on the 
spokesperson’s act rather than what the principal does through her, it does not express the 
same concept as ‘asserts’. The prepositional phrases ‘through …’ and ‘on behalf of …’ alter the 
meaning of what they are attached to, but differently. For convenience, I use ‘asserts’ in italics 
to express what the proxy does. Mr. Nixon did not assert that he had not put before him a 
decision regarding Fitzgerald, but his spokesperson asserted on Nixon’s behalf that he had not, 
and Nixon asserted through his spokesperson that he had not. So in proxy assertion there are 
two extended notions of assertion in play, one for the principal and one for the proxy.  
Does the spokesperson perform an illocutionary act? She performs a locutionary act, in 
J. L. Austin’s sense (Austin 1962), an act that has a certain meaning, for that is a condition on 
her fulfilling her function. She does not perform an illocutionary act of the sort that speakers 
perform in their own voices. She does not assert anything.  But it is not like singing in the 
shower.  It has a point, and there is no reason not to call it an illocutionary point. The 
illocutionary point is not to herself represent something as being the case, but to represent her 
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principal as representing something as being the case.  And we already have a name for this 
type of illocutionary act: it is assertion on behalf of another, or in our notation assertion. It has 
word-to-world direction of fit, and for the spokesperson, its sincerity condition is that she 
believe that she is asserting what her principal intends or wants to assert through her, at least 
in the cases considered so far. 
How is proxy assertion different from someone leaving a written message or making a 
tape recording? One important difference is the proxy is performing a locutionary act in her 
own voice. Her utterance act has a content that is determined by her intentions to use the 
words with a certain meaning, and the context for interpreting the words that she utters is not 
the principal’s but the spokesperson’s. When Kevin Lewis asserted "neither Barack Obama nor 
any White House official under Obama ever ordered surveillance of any U.S. citizen," it is the 
context fixed by Kevin Lewis as speaker and the time of utterance that fixes the interpretation 
of what he says. If he had asserted “neither I nor any White House official under me ever 
ordered surveillance of any U.S. citizen,” he would have been taken to be talking about himself 
rather than Obama.  
 
5. The Spokesperson for a Group5 
 
The spokesperson is one of the primary means by which groups and institutions announce their 
views. The difference between proxy assertion in the case of an individual and in the case of a 
group lies not in the basic mechanism and what the spokesperson does but in who she 
represents and consequently the import of what she says. If we treated groups as on a par with 
individual agents, then there would be no difference between proxy assertion for an individual 
and a group. But if we think collective action involves no group agents per se, we must 
understand the function of the spokesperson differently than in the individual case. In this 
section, we explore how to think about proxy assertion when we reject the idea that groups 
that have spokespersons are themselves agents (but still postpone until section 6 discussion of 
spokesperson autonomy, which applies equally to individuals and groups as the principal).  
On the multiple agents account of group action, a group acts when all of its members 
contribute to bringing something about in some determinate way, and no one who is not a 
member of the group contributes in that way (Ludwig 2007, 2016). For example, if three people 
lift a piano, then each of them (and no one else) makes a direct (hands on) contribution to its 
going up.  
                                                        
5 There has been relatively little published on the topic of group speech acts.  An important pioneering 
paper is (Hughes 1984), who appeals to the notion of a group illocutionary intention in the light of which 
a member speaks, though he does not require authorization, but only that the group not object.  In my 
view, this fails to respect the distinction between speaking in behalf of (in the interests of) and on behalf 
of (as a representative of) a group.  Recent discussions include (Tollefsen 2007; Fricker 2012), on 
learning from group testimony, (Ludwig 2014, 2017b: ch. 13), in which group assertion is discussed as an 
instance of proxy agency more generally, (Lackey 2017), which contains a criticism of the status function 
account and an alternative theory.  See note 6 for discussion of Lackey’s objections to the present 
account.  Tollefsen’s account is based on the account in Hughes and is subject to the same objection.  
See section 5 of Lackey for criticisms of both Fricker and Tollefsen.   
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We begin with a simple case, a chess club holding a press conference to announce a 
new tournament with prize monies. As for an individual represented by a spokesperson, the 
audience has to be in on the arrangements.6 The chess club chooses a member to serve as their 
spokesperson. They authorize the spokesperson jointly, whether they reach a consensus on the 
appointment or take a vote—for even those who vote against the winning candidate 
participate and accept the outcome as appropriate.  All and only its members participate. Thus, 
they jointly do what a single person does, except there are multiple agents of the authorization 
in the case of the chess club.7 
If we reject the view that the chess club is per se an agent and hold that only its 
members are agents, then what the spokesperson does on behalf of the club is not something 
that the club itself could otherwise do.8 In contrast, in the case of an individual with a 
spokesperson, the principal could assert in his own voice what he asserts through his 
spokesperson. And while the point of what the spokesperson does for her principal, when an 
individual, is to commit the principal as if she had asserted what the spokesperson asserts, this 
can’t quite be the aim in the case of the group if the group cannot assert anything in its own 
voice, not being an agent. But it is supposed to commit the group in ways analogous to the way 
an individual is committed who asserts something. For the group intends to commit itself to 
acting in conformity with what it asserts through its spokesperson, that is, to treat what it 
asserts as a fixed point for the purposes of planning about what to do.  (Commitment in this 
sense can of course be insincere, as in the case of individual assertion.)  Since what the group 
does and its significance is not quite what it is in the case of the individual speaking through a 
spokesperson, I both underline and put in boldface the verb ‘assert’ when using it to designate 
what the group does through its spokesperson. I will continue to designate what the 
spokesperson does using ‘assert’ with italics. The group then asserts what it does through its 
spokesperson, who asserts things on its behalf, and the group thereby represents itself to its 
                                                        
6 Lackey objects to this account on two grounds (Lackey 2017).  First, she says that the audience can 
ignore the duly appointed spokesperson for a police department, e.g., because she is a woman and they 
are sexist, but it doesn’t follow that she is not a spokesperson. Second, she says that members of a 
group, again, a police department, need not collectively accept someone as a spokesperson either, 
perhaps also because they are sexist.  But this ignores that in the institutional setting there is a much 
larger group than the people who ignore the spokesperson who sustain the arrangements, namely, 
those who are part of the group that sustains the legal system within which the police chief is authorized 
to appoint a spokesperson.  The important point is that the arrangements are sustained by collective 
acceptance in a community in which they function.  When we are thinking of institutions that are parts 
of much larger institutional arrangements, like a whole legal system, it is the whole system we should 
focus on.  Laws don’t cease to be laws because some people ignore them.  But no one behaves in 
contravention to law, and nothing has a legal status, if there are not enough people who collective 
accept a system of laws and their sustaining institutions.  
7 I work through complications to the basic account in (Ludwig 2017a: ch. 13 section 3). 
8 I don’t mean that there couldn’t be other arrangements for carrying out the transaction, e.g., by each 
member of the club speaking one of the sentences in an announcement at a press conference, but only 
that the group per se cannot be the agent of what the group achieves by the device of spokesperson, 
not being an agent at all.   
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audience as being committed to acting in accordance with what it asserts.  When I have in mind 
a group as principal, I will write ‘proxy assertion’.   
The sincerity condition for assertion cannot be that the group per se believes (in the 
sense in which individuals might believe) what it asserts, if it is not itself an agent. Nor can it be 
that every member of the group believe what is asserted. For just as the group may vote on 
who to appoint as its spokesperson, it may vote on its policies or principles, and not everyone 
may in their own person accept what the group thereby comes officially to accept. In principle, 
as the discursive dilemma shows (Schmitt 1994; Pettit 2001, 2003, 2007; List and Pettit 2011; 
Schmitt 2018), the group could adopt a position officially that none of its members endorse. 
Suppose that the chess club votes on whether to meet in the library on Friday nights. They 
agree that if it is centrally located, the time is convenient, and the facilities are adequate, they 
will meeting in the library on Friday nights. They vote on each question individually with a 
majority vote determining their position; the decision is determined by the votes on the three 
questions relevant to it. The voting goes as shown in Table 1.  
 
  
On each issue, there is a 2/3rds majority in favor of the proposition. The club officially accepts 
that all of the conditions are met for holding meetings on Fridays at the library. But in fact none 
of its members think that all conditions are met, even if they do not all agree on why. Yet, when 
the club announces that meeting on Friday nights at the library satisfies all its criteria for a 
meeting time and location, it does so sincerely.  
What is the sincerity condition for group proxy assertion then?  The group is sincere 
provided simply that its members are jointly committed to acting in accordance with what it 
asserts. We may, if we wish, say that the group is sincere if it believes or perhaps, accepts 
(indicating by underlining a shifted sense for the verbs) what it asserts, but this is merely 
shorthand for what we have just said. See (Ludwig 2017a: ch. 14, sec. 5) for further discussion.  
In sum, group proxy assertion and individual proxy assertion use the same mechanism 
for similar though not exactly the same ends. For an individual, proxy assertion is a way of 
signaling commitment of the sorts undertaken in first person assertion. Its sincerity condition is 
the same as assertion, and it signals the same commitments, though it does not involve the 
principal performing a speech act himself. Group proxy assertion, in contrast, is not a substitute 
for something the group can do as an agent in its own voice. Group proxy assertion is a socially 
constructed act whose purpose is to enable a group to make its joint commitments known to 
Table 1: The Discursive Dilemma 
1/3rd	of	voters 1/3rd	of	voters 1/3rd	of	voters Chess	Club
Location	Central No Yes Yes YES
Time	Convenient Yes No Yes YES
Facilities	Adequate Yes Yes No YES
NO NO NO YES
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others and to commit it publically in a way analogous to the way that an individual is 
committed in asserting something.  
It is similar to the device of a legal fiction, in which a body of law is brought to bear on a 
one area by employing vocabulary from another in relation to things to which it does not 
literally apply (Fuller 1967). The effect is to reinterpret systematically the relevant discourse in 
light of the empirical criteria for its application. An example of a legal fiction is the issuance (in 
some jurisdictions) of a new birth certificate for a child when it is adopted with the names of its 
adoptive parents entered as its birth parents. This subsumes the relation of the child to the 
parents under the legal rules governing the relations of children to their birth parents without 
having to extensively rewrite the law. The force that presentation of the birth certification has 
for birth parents is transferred intact to adoptive parents.  
We can summarize the distinctions of the last two sections in Table 2.  
 
 
Table 2: Varieties of Assertion 
6. Spokesperson Autonomy 
 
We have so far considered only the case of a spokesperson who is given an explicit message to 
convey and conveys it in the same words. But the role of a spokesperson is not limited to 
repeating a message that the principal has explicitly supplied. The spokesperson, as for proxy 
agents in general, may be authorized within broad guidelines to represent her principal. This is 
a fruitful extension of the basic idea but introduces some complications.  
When the spokesperson is given some autonomy, she is responsible for representing the 
views of her principal on a certain matter. Thus the principal is responsible for explaining those 
Notation Act	Type Example Report






















For The Oxford Handbook of Assertion, ed. Sandy Goldberg. 
 13 
views to the spokesperson, while leaving it open how exactly to convey them. The 
spokesperson is in this respect like a ghostwriter. The spokesperson interprets her principal to 
his audience. This has several advantages. First, the spokesperson is in a position to respond to 
questions about her principal’s views without having had to anticipate all of them beforehand. 
Second, the spokesperson, if aptly chosen, like a ghostwriter, often has better skills than the 
principal in explaining things on the fly and putting them in a way that is persuasive and 
compelling.  Third, the spokesperson can make decisions about how much and what to say 
about any particular topic, with her principal’s interests in mind. Fourth, the spokesperson, 
acting with authorization, but also with autonomy, distances the principal to some extent from 
what the spokesperson says and does. 
Spokesperson autonomy raises three important complications in the theory of proxy 
assertion.9 First, what do we say the principal is doing when the spokesperson formulates 
things in her own words. Is it still true that the principal is asserting what the spokesperson 
asserts? To what extent or in what sense is the principal intentionally conveying what the 
spokesperson says? Second, what is the spokesperson doing? To what extent is she now 
speaking in her own voice? Third, and connected with this, when the White House 
spokesperson, e.g., refers to reporters by name, and engages in banter and interaction as an 
agent in her own right, what is the relation of that to her job as representing the principal?  
With respect to the first, while the spokesperson in speaking still intends to be 
representing her principal, it is clear that the principal, being unaware of the specific details of 
what his spokesperson says, cannot be credited with intending that she say those specific 
things. If the principal’s spokesperson says, in response to a question, for example, “That’s not 
what he said,” referring to her principal, we would not say that the principal intended to assert 
that, because he could not have anticipated the question. How is this related to how we report 
what the principal asserted? Does the principal have to intend the specific content of what his 
spokesperson says to assert it?  
When we report on press conferences in which a spokesperson is exercising autonomy 
in responding to questions, typically we speak about what the spokesperson says in her role 
rather than the principal saying or asserting various things. This plausibly reflects a desire to 
avoid a misleading impression. Often when a principal is reported as asserting something 
through a spokesperson, mixed indirect discourse is used, in which the words that were used 
are themselves quoted in the content clause, as in our opening example. These report the 
actual authorized text or content of the message being conveyed, and the use of quotation 
marks helps to signal that the specific content of spokesperson’s message has been authorized 
and so lies in the content of the principal’s intention. 
                                                        
9 An additional complication which I do not have space to discuss in detail is the case in which the 
spokesperson is granted at the same time the authority to make policy for a group that she represents.  
In this case, she may assert something on behalf of the group that the group did not intend though they 
can be credited with asserting it because she has the authority to commit them to it.  There is an analog 
in the individual case, e.g., in legal representation. The key to this is the possibility of the principal giving 
the authority to another to commit the principal to something by asserting it in her role.  A general 
power of attorney provides a model for this.   
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This suggests that we link asserting that p with intending to represent that p (or 
something from which that p follows straightforwardly) through one’s spokesperson. The 
principal does intend, of course, to represent his views to his audience through his 
spokesperson, even when it is left up to the spokesperson how to formulate the details. But 
when the degree of definiteness of the principal’s intention does not reach the details of what 
the spokesperson says, we do not say that the principal intended to assert those things 
specifically. However, under a more general description we may say that the principal 
responded to or denied charges or explained his position, etc., through his spokesperson. For 
example, in this report in the Washington Examiner (Feb. 17, 2015), of an interview given by 
Marie Harf of the State Department on MSNBC, in the first instance, Harf is reported to have 
explained, in her role as spokesperson, the Obama administration’s policies for dealing with 
ISIS. 
 
U.S. State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf explained Monday that the Islamic 
State of Iraq and Syria, which has marauded through much of the Middle East, leaving 
thousands dead, won’t be defeated through military force but through responsible 
governance and better job opportunities. Harf’s explanation of the Obama 
administration’s plan for dealing with the deadly ISIS threat came in response to a 
question from MSNBC’s Chris Matthews. 
 
We can also say that the Obama administration explained its policies for dealing with ISIS 
through a spokesperson. Furthermore, when it is clear that the content is something that is 
reasonably close to the official message or follows straightforwardly from it, we will generally 
accept reports of the principal having claimed or announced, as appropriate, roughly what the 
spokesperson conveys, though often abstracting from the details of its presentation. For 
example, when Harf responds, in the same interview, to a question about how ISIS can be 
defeated through better job opportunities, she says, 
 
Well, I think there’s a few stages here. Right now what we’re doing is trying to take their 
leaders and their fighters off the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. That’s really where they 
flourish. 
 
It would be appropriate to report that the administration asserted, through a spokesperson, 
that they had a multistage plan for defeating ISIS, the first stage of which is to get their leaders 
and fighters off the battlefield in Iraq and Syria. In this case, it is gist of what is said that is 
attributed to the principal (in this case the administration rather than just the President). We 
would not say, however, that the administration claimed that Harf thought that there are a few 
stages here, though that is the content of one of her utterances.  Thus, we can distinguish two 
levels of content:  a more general level attributed to the administration, and a more specific 
level that is an expression of the choices of the spokesperson about how to convey it.   
 With respect to the second complication, what we have just said shows what to say 
about this.  When representing her principal, even when choosing her own words to do it, she 
is representing herself as representing her principal, not with respect to the particular words 
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and phrase, but rather with respect to the gist of what is conveyed, the more general level that 
can be attributed to the administration.   
Turning to the third complication, a spokesperson who is holding a press conference will 
often interact with reporters or the audience in her own voice, calling reporters by name, 
making jokes, and so on. She is interacting with them in the role of spokesperson, but in these 
interactions she is not speaking on behalf of her principal. The spokesperson may move back 
and forth in the course of a press conference between representing herself in her role in 
interacting with members of the audience in their roles, and representing her principal. When 
she represents herself, she speaks in the ordinary way in her own voice. When she represents 
her principal, she speaks on the principal’s behalf. She is responsible for what she says in her 
own voice. Her principal is responsible for what she says in representing him, as long as she 
does not stray from her writ—does not go rogue, to use Lackey’s term (2017).   
There are additional complications illustrated by the last quotation. For in representing 
her principal Harf inserts herself into the narrative. She says, “I think there are stages here.” Is 
she speaking in her own voice or is she representing her principal? This is a common 
phenomenon. Indeed, sometimes a spokesperson who appears to represent someone or an 
organization will speak almost entirely in her own voice, and even deny that she is speaking for 
her principal. For example, in an appearance on ABC news, Trump spokesperson Sarah 
Huckabee Sanders was asked by Martha Raddatz whether Trump did not believe Obama’s 
denial that he ordered any surveillance on him. She replied: “I think they don’t have the best 
track record... to pretend this is a clean and credible source, coming from — I’m sorry I’m just 
not buying that.” She also said that she “could not speak for the president” on whether Trump 
believes that Obama ordered the alleged phone tap. Is she or is she not representing President 
Trump? 
The two cases, Harf and Sanders, appear to be different because Sanders aims to be 
making propaganda in or on behalf of the Trump administration while maintaining the 
appearance of speaking in her own voice, whereas Harf is clearly representing herself as 
representing the plans of the State Department. But they share some things in common. Harf’s 
shift to speaking in her own voice serves at least two aims. First, it contributes to the 
informality of the exchange, treating it as an ordinary conversation. This makes it more 
engaging. Second, it provides some distance between what Harf says and those she represents.  
It allows them (and her) to attribute anything to which they do not want to be committed, ex 
post facto, to their spokesperson speaking in her own voice or choosing, perhaps inaptly, her 
own words to convey her principal’s views. Sanders engages in the same game but takes it 
further. She is asked, as spokesperson for Trump, whether Trump believed Obama’s denial that 
he had ordered Trump’s phones wiretapped. One expects the response to reflect the 
administration’s position. But instead of responding directly, she says that she doesn’t think 
that Obama is a credible source. She thereby invites viewers to accept that and accept it as the 
view of the administration or of Trump. After it has had a moment to take root, she then denies 
that she can speak for Trump on whether he believes Obama ordered Trump’s phones tapped. 
This provides then the basis for later denying that the first thing she said represents Trump’s 
views or the administration’s views either. Thus, in actual practice, the interleaving of the 
spokesperson speaking in her own voice and as representative of her principal is exploited to 
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generate ambiguity about what parts of what the spokesperson says represent the views of her 
principal.  
This brings us to a final topic: when can the principal legitimately disavow something that 
the spokesperson says on the principal’s behalf? The general answer is that when the 
spokesperson exceeds the authority given to her to represent the principal, the principal can 
disavow what the spokesperson says. The clearest case is in one in which the spokesperson is 
given a specific message and goes off script. Everything off script can be disavowed. When the 
spokesperson’s authority allows her to choose how to convey the principal’s views, if she 
represents her principal’s views in a way that clearly is contrary to what she has been told to 
convey, then the principal can legitimately disavow what she says. As we have seen above, the 
principal cannot be held to have intended the particular ways that the spokesperson expresses 
her views. Thus, the principal can disavow anything in the details of what the spokesperson 
says below the level of definiteness of intention of the principal in expressing the principal’s 
views. For example, the Trump administration was not taken to be committed to Sean Spicer’s 
claim on April 11, 2017, that “you had someone as despicable as Hitler who didn’t even sink to 
using chemical weapons,” and that “when you come to sarin gas, he was not using the gas on 
his own people the same way that Assad is doing.” Inevitably, there will be some vagueness 
about what a spokesperson is authorized to convey, and in these cases there will be no clear 
answer to the question. This has its own utility for a group or person speaking through a 
spokesperson, for it allows the possibility of ex post facto editing of the official record to serve 
the principal’s interests. 
Finally, while the principal can disavow anything that his spokesperson says that goes 
beyond her writ or which is below the level of definiteness of his intention, he need not.  He 
may endorse ex post facto what his spokesperson says beyond her writ and he may likewise 
endorse various, perhaps inspired ways, of explaining his views or representing them that were 
below the level of definiteness of his intention.  This is to stand behind them as if they had been 
specifically intended, though it is of course not to rewrite history so that they were intended all 
along.  In many contexts, it may be that the default in the absence of explicit disavowal is 
endorsement, even when the spokesperson goes beyond her writ, provided that it is clear that 
the principal is aware of what his spokesperson has said on his behalf and has had an 




Proxy assertion is assertion by proxy. How does it work? The proxy has a status role. The status 
role enables her to perform utterance acts that count as committing her principal in the same 
way or a way analogous to assertion in the first person case.  A status role is a status function 
assigned to an agent that requires her to exercise her agency in fulfilling the function. A status 
function is a role assigned to something in a social transaction by collective acceptance, which is 
at bottom a matter of a group’s being prepared to treat it, when circumstances are appropriate, 
as having the role, where the role is defined by constitutive rules for the action type without 
specifying the role filler. The status role for proxy assertion is that of spokesperson.  Her 
function in the basic case is to perform locutionary acts within her authorization that represent 
her principal, if an individual, as committed just as if he had asserted it himself, or, if a group, as 
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committed to treating what the spokesperson says as a fixed point in planning about what to 
do. This constitutes the spokesperson’s utterance having a status function in a transaction 
between her principal and the audience. Paradigmatically, the spokesperson is chosen by the 
principal, and given the message to convey, or instructions about the views of the principal. 
This requires that the audience be in on the arrangements and to be prepared to do its part in 
attending to the spokesperson acting in her role.  A spokesperson does not assert in her own 
voice, but asserts on behalf of her principal, and the principal asserts, if an individual, or 
asserts, if a group, through the spokesperson. If the spokesperson is given autonomy in 
representing her principal, attributions to the principal may, and frequently must, abstract from 
the details of what the spokesperson says. The principal may repudiate anything that the 
spokesperson says that goes beyond her writ or any details below the degree of definiteness of 
the principal’s intention.  
 
SEE ALSO:  
 
Constitutive Norm View, Commitment View, Assertion Among the Speech Acts, Assertion 
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